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Abstract
We use experimental methods to demonstrate the anti-competitive potential of price
matching guarantees in both symmetric and asymmetric cost duopolies. Our
findings establish that when costs are symmetric, price-matching guarantees
significantly increase market prices. In markets with cost asymmetries, guaranteed
prices remain high relative to prices without the use of guarantees, but the overall
ability of price guarantees to act as a collusion facilitating device becomes
contingent on the relative cost difference. Lesser use of guarantees, combined with
lower average prices and slower convergence to the collusive level, suggest that the
mere presence of cost asymmetries may curtail collusive behavior.
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1. Introduction
In many market environments sellers ‘guarantee’ their price by promising that it is the
lowest amongst all their competitors; if not, they will match the lowest price that the customer
can find elsewhere in the market. The use of such competitor-based price matching policies is
widespread, appearing in industries such as banking, natural gas, and construction as well as
retail products such as electronics, kitchen appliances, pharmaceuticals, diamonds, auto-parts,
tires, and prescription drugs.2 Taken at face value, these policies appear pro-consumer. For
example, when a funeral home in Chicago promised to match prices from any local
competition, the article in Financial Times was titled “Price Wars Spreading” (Millman,
1994). In the theoretical literature, however, such policies are regarded as mechanisms to
facilitate collusion amongst competing firms either through consumer-enforced information
exchange, by rewarding consumers for reporting discounts of the competitors, or through
incentive management, by altering the payoff structure so that joint profit maximization is
optimal and the prisoner’s dilemma is avoided. This paper uses experimental methods to
demonstrate the anti-competitive potential of competitor-based price matching guarantees in
both symmetric and asymmetric cost markets. We find that, irrespective of the level of
asymmetry, experimental duopoly markets with price matching guarantees have significantly
higher prices relative to those without such guarantees.
The marketing literature holds the view that consumers regard price matching policies as a
heuristic for low prices. Consumers believe that sellers, who either enjoy a cost advantage or
want to build their market share, use such guarantees to signal low prices (e.g. Chatterjee and
Roy, 1997), Jain and Srivastava, 2000). The refund cost the seller stands to incur if the lowprice signal is incorrect acts as a bond, which further enhances the ‘false sense of security’.
Not just the ordinary consumer, even industry analysts have viewed price matching
announcements as intensifying price competition.3
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Edlin and Emch (1999) document that the use of price guarantees can be traced back to 1947 (International Salt
Co. versus United States 332 US 131). Over time, low-price guarantees have assumed different forms such as
most favored customer clauses, meet-or release clauses, price matching and price beating policies (either by a
fraction, dollar or percentage difference amount). Even price matching policies may be differentiated based on
whether they are retroactive (applicable to seller’s own past prices) or competitor-based (applicable to seller’s
price relative to its competitor). In this study, we concentrate solely on competitor-based price matching policies.
3
For example, when Esso, a UK petrol retailer, announced a policy to match prices, their competitors said a
price war was the likely outcome of the company’s actions, and Shell retaliated by immediately cutting their
prices (Corzine, 1996).
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Price guarantees seem beneficial to the consumer because they ensure purchase at the
lowest price in the market. A subtle, yet important, difference is that it does not ensure that
the seller offering the guarantee is in fact the lowest priced seller. A price matching seller
could raise prices without losing any customer until its competitors also raise their prices,
thereby creating collusion without any formal agreement. The ability of price guarantees to
eliminate a competitor’s incentive to undercut prices was first pointed out by Salop (1986).
Since then, the anti-competitive effects of price matching policies have been examined in a
variety of settings. Doyle (1988) presents a formal analysis for multiple sellers of a
homogeneous good and shows that collusion exists if and only if all sellers adopt price
matching strategies. Belton (1987) and Logan & Lutter (1989) extend the result to a
differentiated goods duopoly. In the former study, sellers are symmetric while in the latter, an
asymmetric cost structure is explored. Both studies consider a two-stage game where sellers
first decide whether or not to adopt price guarantee and then choose their price. However,
Chen (1995) shows that the collusive outcome is invariant to the timing of price-andguarantee decisions, whether simultaneous or sequential. Other research supports the anticompetitive results using advertising (Baye and Kovenock, 1994), vertical price fixing (Butz,
1993) and overlapping-generation models (Schnitzer, 1994).4 Edlin and Emch probably sum
up the literature best, by noting that, “adopting a guaranteed-low-price policy is a good
substitute for actually having low prices…” (pg. 145, 1999).
The empirical literature aimed at testing the effect of price matching policies is both
scarce and inconclusive. Hess and Gerstner (1991) examine weekly supermarket prices before
and after the adoption of price matching guarantees and find support for the collusive theory.
They show that guarantees not only yield greater conformity in prices, but also result in a
statistically significant increase in average price for products included in the guarantee
relative to those not covered by guarantees. Citing evidence from the SEC and Department of
Justice, Edlin and Emich (1999) note that the computerized matching system on the
NASDAQ stock exchange may explain the higher-than-competitive level of bid-ask spreads.
On the other hand, Arbatskaya et al. (1999) use data from retail tire markets to show that
although an increase in the percentage of sellers adopting low-price guarantees does tend to
4

While facilitation of collusion features predominantly as a reason for adoption of price guarantees; other
reasons for adoption cited elsewhere in the literature include entry deterrence (Belton, 1987), signaling (Moorthy
and Winter, 2005) and price discrimination (Png & Hirschleifer, 1987)
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raise the advertised price in the market, there is no significant difference between prices
advertised by sellers offering these guarantees relative to those offering no such guarantees.
Further, Arbatskaya et al. (2004) document that while price matching guarantees are the most
common form of low-price guarantees (accounting for almost nearly two-thirds of all
guarantees and are adopted by 73 percent of the sellers), nearly 44 percent of the price
matching guarantees appear inconsistent with their use as collusion facilitating device.
Differentiating between price matching and price beating policies, Arbatskaya et al. (2005)
find that price matching leads to higher advertised prices in the tire retail market, whereas Liu
(2006) finds that price beating policies are more consistent with higher prices in electronic
goods markets.
This lack of unequivocal conclusion regarding price guarantees is not surprising when we
account for the difficulties encountered in the field data. To start, it is difficult to construct
counterfactual prices that would have prevailed if stores did not have price guarantees.
Furthermore, in the absence of any other feasible alternative, most empirical studies utilize
data from different stores that have different types of guarantees at different points in time.
Much of the difference in results can therefore be explained by seller, market, product and
guarantee heterogeneity. Experimental methods, on the other hand, can provide direct
empirical evidence. In the laboratory, basic underlying structural and informational conditions
are induced and hence known. We can directly control for unrealistic assumptions such as
product homogeneity, complete information about demand and costs and no capacity
constraints, as well as various complicating factors that plague field data such as reputation
formation and brand proliferation. The focus on predicted effectiveness of price matching
guarantees as a collusion facilitating device is therefore unambiguous.
Despite the numerous methodological advantages, to date, few studies have examined
competitor-based pricing policies in a laboratory setting. Fatás and Mañez (2004) analyze a
differentiated product, price-setting duopoly model where price matching policies may be
either imposed as an institution or made available as an option. Irrespective of the
implementation mechanism, they find that price matching leads to higher prices when
compared to no price matching. Deck and Wilson (2003) report that price matching policies
generate significantly higher prices and profits when compared to either undercutting or
trigger pricing. In related works, Dugar (2005) and Dugar and Sorensen (2006) test the
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collusive prediction of these guarantees in a homogeneous goods market and find support for
the anti-competitive theory, but only in the absence of hassle costs. Although these
experimental studies concur with the dominant view of price matching as a collusion
facilitator, none have examined the impact of these guarantees in the presence of cost
asymmetries between sellers. Cost asymmetry influences the relative gains from collusion and
therefore can provide a direct test of the robustness of price guarantees as a collusion
facilitating device.
This paper uses experimental methods to examine how price matching guarantees affect
prices in duopoly markets with both symmetric and asymmetric costs. The symmetric cost
treatment replicates the price matching environment of previous studies, with few distinctions.
Unlike Fatás and Mañez (2004), we employ a homogenous goods environment, since price
matching guarantees are more likely to be instituted for identical products.5 This homogeneity
of goods assumption has important implications for profit calculations, since the competitive
equilibrium yields zero profit in our study, whereas competitive profit is positive with
differentiated goods. Our model therefore allows an examination of the upper bound of the
possible price effects from price matching. It is also a much simpler setting, where
determination of quantity relative to price choices of both sellers in the market is clear. In
Fatás and Mañez (2004), subjects lacked information about the underlying demand model,
making the relationship between subjects’ price choices and consequent profit relatively
imprecise. Also contrary to the design of Deck and Wilson (2003), where subjects chose from
a wide variety of complex rules, we consider only two basic settings. The control treatment of
no price matching is compared to markets where price matching is available as an option.
This singularity in the type of pricing policy is not only easier for the subjects to understand,
but also releases the data from the endogeneity imposed by differing adoption rates for
different policies. Finally, in order to obtain parallelism with the field environment, unlike
Dugar (2005) and Dugar and Sorensen (2006), we allow the price matching option to be
available every four periods, while the pricing decision is made every period.6 This feature of
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Chen (1995, pg. 684) state that “an identical product model appears to be more appropriate than a differentiated
product model for an analysis of MCC (meeting competition clause)”.
6
Theoretical literature has also emphasized the relative permanent nature of guarantee decisions (Logan and
Lutter, 1989). Fatás and Mañez (2004) and Fatás et al. (2005) employ a similar design choice for guarantee
decisions in their experiments.
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our design also allows subjects to learn the relationship between their guarantee decisions and
its possible consequences over price and profit.
Despite the above-documented differences, our results when costs are symmetric are
similar to those obtained in these studies: Price matching facilitates collusion. It is therefore
crucial to note that our motivation to include the symmetric cost treatment is not just
replication in a slightly different environment but, more importantly, to provide a benchmark
for comparison when costs are asymmetric.
The asymmetric cost treatment is the novel feature of our study. Both theoretical and
experimental literature suggests that asymmetry in costs would make tacit collusion
significantly more difficult. The reasoning is simple: with asymmetric costs, high cost and
low cost sellers experience differential gains from cheating on an implicit agreement. This
implies that agents in these asymmetric markets have relatively different incentives to
cooperate, making collusion both less viable and less stable. Since most naturally occurring
oligopolies are characterized by cost asymmetries, it is important to analyze whether the anticompetitive outcome of price matching policies can be extended to (or is sustainable under)
cost asymmetries. This may be particularly relevant from the perspective of policy
prescription. Another justification for the treatment is provided by casual observation that
despite the much touted collusive result, not all sellers adopt price matching policies. By
controlling the demand side and other noisy factors such as buyer search cost and hassle cost,
we can explore the reason for lack of universal adoption from the perspective of the seller
alone. Accordingly, in our design we consider two different levels of cost asymmetry: one
where price matching is optimal for both sellers in the market and prices are collusive, and
another where adoption of price matching does not curtail the seller’s incentive to undercut
and high-marginal cost pricing prevails.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the
theoretical model while Section III presents our experimental design and procedures. Section
IV articulates the theoretical predictions and testable hypotheses. The results are detailed in
Section V and Section VI concludes.

6

2. Theoretical Model
Consider a price-setting duopoly where each seller i supplies a homogeneous product at a
constant marginal cost, ci . Sellers compete by simultaneously choosing a posted price pi and
announcing whether or not they will match their competitor’s price. A seller’s strategy space
is therefore given by {pi, Φi } where:
⎧ NPM = no price-matching guarantee
Φi = ⎨
⎩ PM = price-matching guarantee
The price policy, Φi , implies that the effective price of seller i is pie , where:

pi
if Φi = NPM
⎧⎪
pie = ⎨
⎪⎩min { pi , p-i } if Φi = PM
On the demand side of the market, we assume that all n consumers are fully informed of
the prices and policies of both sellers.7 They purchase at most one unit of the good at the
lowest price equal to or below a reservation value r, and incur no cost to redeem the price
guarantee. Consumers are assumed to have no preference with respect to either seller, and
distribute themselves evenly between the two in the event of identical effective prices. This
consumer demand model is known to both sellers, and is given by:
⎧
⎪
⎪
qi = ⎨
⎪
⎪⎩

n if pie < p-ei
n
if pie = p-ei
2
0 if pie > r , p-ei < pie

The profit of seller i, given cost of production ci , is simply:
Πi = ( pie − ci )qi

Using the Nash solution concept, the equilibrium is defined as a set of prices, price policy and
effective prices { pi , Φ i , pie } that are consistent, i.e. pie = Φ i ( pie , pi ) so that neither seller has
an incentive to deviate. We restrict our focus to equilibrium in pure strategies.
Within this general framework, we consider two cases. One, where both sellers have the
same cost ( ci = c) and another, where the cost of production differs across the two sellers (cl <
7

Hviid and Shaffer (1999) find that price matching policies lose their collusive potential when consumers have
to incur hassle costs in order to obtain refunds. Assuming the demand side to be perfectly informed allows us to
isolate the extent to which the adoption of price matching guarantees is influenced by seller characteristics alone.
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ch). In case of symmetric cost, without the availability of price matching guarantees, the
unique Nash equilibrium is (c,c). The intuition is simply that at any price above marginal cost,
undercutting is profitable. By slightly decreasing his price a seller can potentially supply the
entire market and thereby attain a substantial increase in profit. The presence of price
matching policy, however, eliminates this incentive to undercut. By adopting price matching,
a seller is effectively guaranteeing its competitor that any attempt to decrease price will be
matched immediately, thereby eliminating any gains from price cut. Doyle (1988) and Corts
(1995), amongst others, have shown that when sellers have symmetric costs, the unique
Pareto efficient equilibrium is monopoly pricing with all sellers adopting price matching
policies ( pie = r ).8 The reasoning is simple: if both sellers adopt price matching, undercutting
the competitor’s price is no longer optimal for seller i since lowering the price ( pi < r ) only
lowers the effective price while yielding no increase in seller i’s market share. Similarly,
raising the price above the buyer’s reservation price ( pi > r ) does not change the effective
price and therefore profit remains unchanged. Finally, not adopting the price matching policy
by seller i at most leads to lower effective price if pi ≤ p− i with no change in profit, and
yields zero profit otherwise.
When sellers’ costs differ, Logan and Lutter (1989) demonstrate that the ability of price
matching guarantees to act as a facilitating device is no longer universally dominant, but
instead is contingent on the level of cost asymmetry. For the low cost seller (cl ), the question
is whether to collude and split the market with the high cost seller, or to employ its cost
advantage and capture the entire market. The answer lies in the magnitude of the cost
difference. When the cost difference is small (cl < ch1), it is advantageous for both sellers to
collude and price at the reservation value r. That is, there exists an equilibrium in which both
sellers adopt price matching and prices rise to the Pareto optimal level. However, with a
significantly larger cost difference (cl << ch2), it is no longer profitable for the low cost seller
to cooperate with the high cost seller. Instead, the low cost seller earns greater profit by
8

The collusive equilibrium is not a unique Nash equilibrium. The decision by one or both firms to refrain from
price matching with both firms setting their (effective) prices at the Bertrand level is also an equilibrium.
Moreover, when both firms adopt price matching, every price in the interval [c,r] constitutes a symmetric Nash
equilibrium. The collusive equilibrium is the unique equilibrium only upon applying some refinement to the
Nash equilibrium concept. Belton (1987) argues that monopoly price equilibrium emerges because of sub-game
perfection. Moorthy and Winter (2005) employ trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, while Doyle (1988) uses
iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategy.
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undercutting the high cost seller and capturing all of the consumer demand. This makes the
adoption of a price matching guarantee sub-optimal for the high cost seller, causing the
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium price to prevail.9, 10

3. Experimental Design and Procedures

This experiment uses the standard posted offer market institution to organize the duopoly
market. Sellers produce a homogeneous good at a cost which may differ across the two
sellers. Information about the two sellers’ costs is always common knowledge in the market.
Sellers do not face any capacity constraints, and can satisfy entire consumer demand. On the
demand side, the market is comprised of ten automated buyers, each with a reservation value
of $10. These automated buyers are programmed to purchase from the lowest-priced seller or,
in the event of tie, split themselves equally across sellers.
Each period, sellers simultaneously post their prices. In order to make the experimental
environment compatible with the field counterpart we allow for a nearly continuous price
space {$0,$0.01,…,$98.99,$99} with prices up to 2 decimal points. Depending on the
treatment, every 4 periods sellers also decide whether or not to adopt price guarantees. There
is no cost associated with the adoption of price guarantee. At the end of each period, sellers
receive information regarding their and other seller’s price and pricing policies (where
relevant) and their own profits. This information is also made available as a history table on
subjects’ decision screens.
We chose to randomly reassign subjects to different duopolies every guarantee decision
period. This 4-period fixed matching enables us to concentrate on price dynamics, keeping
both the sellers in the market and their choice of price guarantee constant. It also parallels the
field environment where market structure does not change often. On the other hand, using a
random re-matching mechanism reduces the repeated game incentives, thereby providing a
stronger test for the collusion hypothesis.11 In the experiment, 16 subjects comprised one
9

The low-cost seller is always indifferent between adopting and not adopting the price matching guarantee.
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For the parameters of the model, it is easy to show equilibrium is collusive as long as ch <

r + cl
2

. If the cost

of the high-cost seller increases beyond this threshold, competitive Bertrand pricing emerges. Refer to Logan and
Lutter (1989) for the formal proof.
11
Fatás et al. (2005), for example, find that average prices are significantly higher under price beating policies
when the matching protocol involves repeated play with the same rival.
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experimental cohort. Each cohort was split into two sessions of 8 sellers each, and the random
matching took place within these distinct sessions. This enables us to obtain two independent
observations from each cohort.12
The experimental design features two treatment variables: availability of price matching
guarantees and level of cost asymmetry. Each session proceeds through a sequence of 64
trading periods. We always began with the baseline No Price Matching (NPM) treatment,
where sellers choose only their prices every period. This treatment provides a benchmark for
comparison with the Price Matching (PM) treatment, wherein sellers may incorporate price
matching guarantees as an additional option into their profit-maximizing strategies, while still
setting prices every period. Three points need to be noted with regard to the PM treatment.
First, price matching is an option (as opposed to an institution) and sellers can decide whether
or not to use it every four periods. This long-term determination of guarantee usage can be
rationalized by the fact that firms are able to change their price more often than they can
change their guarantee policy. Second, we employ a within-subjects design to study the
impact of price guarantees. Having the same set of subjects making decisions under different
treatments, both NPM and PM, directly controls for subject variability. However, it also may
result in a hysteresis effect, with subject experience in one treatment influencing their
behavior in the other treatment. To account for such sequencing effects, we employ an A-B-A
design. Finally, each PM treatment lasted for (at least) 24 periods, while the NPM treatment
lasted for only 16 rounds. Longer PM treatments allows for greater learning. Since price
guarantees can only be adjusted every four rounds, it is important to provide a significant
number of opportunities for subjects to experience this option.
The experimental design for the symmetric cost treatment is summarized in Table 1.A. In
this treatment, ci = c = 5. Our main focus is to examine how the availability of price matching
as a possible pricing strategy affects prices and competition and, in particular, whether the use
of guarantee pricing policies facilitates collusion. The asymmetric cost treatment extends the
analysis further to test the robustness of price guarantees as a collusive device when one seller
has a cost advantage. Accordingly, in our design we consider two levels of asymmetry. The
12

This increases the number of statistically independent observations while keeping the greatest number of
outside factors constant. Duffy and Ochs (2006) find that the total number of participants in a session does not
affect the value to random matching, making the return to having 16 subjects in one session not significantly
better than 8 subjects per session.
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low cost (cl) is equal to 2 in both cases, while the high cost is controlled at two levels: ch1 = 5
and ch 2 = 8 .
The experimental design for the asymmetric cost treatment is summarized in Table 1.B.
As discussed later in the results section, our design evolved over the course of study, as we
included more sessions to answer questions posed by prior sessions. We initially ran a set of
eight “dual cost” sessions where we varied both availability of price guarantees and the level
of cost asymmetry. In these sessions, the sequence of treatments was as follows: subjects first
participated in a NPM treatment for 16 periods with a particular level of cost asymmetry (i.e.

cl = 2 and ch1 = 5). In the next sequence of 24 periods, the option of a price matching
guarantee was made available, while keeping the level of cost asymmetry unchanged. The
final sequence of 24 periods featured a PM treatment with a different level of asymmetry (cl =
2 and ch2 = 8). Furthermore, in the asymmetric treatment, cost of a seller was switched every
four periods i.e. if seller 1 is a high cost seller in periods 1-4, she becomes a low cost seller in
periods 5-8, and so on.
This orthogonal, within-session design allowed for an analysis of the effect of both cost
asymmetries and price guarantees, while controlling for subject variability. Our primary goal
was to determine whether subjects are able to comprehend the relative cost advantage
afforded by each asymmetry level and incorporate the resulting difference in incentives into
their pricing decisions. Switching costs every 4 periods enabled subjects to learn the
incentives as both a high and low cost seller. It also meant equal opportunities to make profit
so that the impact of other-regarding preferences like inequity aversion and reciprocity could
be avoided. However, unlike the symmetric cost sessions where prices in the PM treatment
converged relatively quickly to the collusive level, the variation in prices was much greater in
the asymmetric cost sessions. The experimental design component that changed seller costs
every four periods, along with the guarantee decision, for a total of six times, now assumed
significance. It was conjectured that variation in prices might simply be indicative of lack of
comprehension, and would decline if subjects had more time to learn the incentives under
each cost structure.
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To address these concerns, we ran ten additional “single cost” sessions where the cost
asymmetry was fixed at one level throughout the session.13 That is, sessions featured either
small cost asymmetry (cl = 2 and ch1 = 5) or large cost asymmetry (cl = 2 and ch2 = 8). As
before, the first 16 periods employed the baseline NPM treatment, but now the PM treatment,
with constant cost asymmetry, spanned the remaining 48 periods. Another variation was the
number of periods sellers experienced a certain cost. In the previous set of “dual cost”
sessions, sellers’ costs switched every four periods, accompanied by new price guarantee
decision. To avoid intermixing guarantee decisions with changing seller costs, we ran four
sessions where seller costs in the PM treatment switched every 12 periods and four sessions
where the switch took place every 24 periods.14 Finally, we ran two large cost asymmetry
sessions where the price matching decision was made available every period.
All experimental sessions were conducted at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics
Laboratory at Purdue University using the program z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999). A total of
208 undergraduate students participated in 26 sessions. Upon arrival, subjects were instructed
to sit at a computer. The instructions (contained in the Appendix) were read aloud prior to
each section of the experiment, and subjects were not allowed to communicate at any time. At
the end of the session, they received total profits, privately and in cash, converted from
Experimental Dollars ($) to U.S. dollars using a pre-determined conversion rate. The sessions
usually lasted about 90 minutes and the average earnings were approximately US$22.00.
4. Theoretical Benchmarks and Testable Hypotheses

In the symmetric cost treatment, sellers make a maximum payoff of $25 per period by
colluding to price at the reservation price. However, the incentive to “cheat” and charge
slightly less than the competitor is the basis for the classical model of price competition’s
prediction that, in equilibrium, price equals marginal cost. The availability of price matching
serves to decrease or eliminate the incentive to cheat and makes the collusive outcome
sustainable. The testable hypotheses for the symmetric cost treatment, following predictions
by Corts (1995), may therefore be summarized as follows:

13

We thank the associate editor for this design suggestion.
In sessions S19, S20, S23, and S24, a subject was a low-cost seller in the first 24 periods of the PM sequence
and high cost seller in the next 24 periods. The duration for cost switch was 12 periods in the remaining “single
cost” sessions.
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Hypothesis 1: Prices are higher in the PM treatment than in the NPM treatment. Specifically,

prices in the PM treatment converge to the collusive level ($10, $10) with sellers making a
profit of $25 each, whereas the NPM treatment yields marginal cost pricing ($5, $5).
Hypothesis 2: Both sellers adopt price matching guarantees when available.

In the asymmetric cost treatment, theoretical predictions differ for the two levels of
asymmetry. In the case of small cost asymmetry, cl = 2 and ch1 = 5, a ‘competitive’ outcome
results when the low cost seller undercuts the high cost seller and supplies the entire market.
In this equilibrium, the low cost seller makes a profit of $29.90 (if pricing exactly one cent
below the high marginal cost), while the high cost seller earns zero profit. The ‘collusive’
prediction, on the other hand, is that both sellers charge the reservation value of $10 and split
the market. In this case, the low cost seller makes a profit of $40, while the high cost seller
makes a profit of $25. Though the collusive outcome provides higher profits for both sellers,
making it Pareto superior to the Bertrand-Nash outcome, the incentive for either seller to
“cheat” and charge slightly less than their competitor, makes it unlikely that the collusive
strategy will be observed in the experiment.
Similar to the case with symmetric costs, the availability of price matching makes the
collusive outcome much more likely, since any undercutting would be immediately matched
by the rival seller. The profit maximizing prediction for the PM treatment with small cost
differences is for both sellers to match prices and charge the reservation value in every round.
However, introducing cost asymmetries into a market with price matching may make it harder
for sellers to reach the collusive outcome than if costs were symmetric. When costs are
symmetric, both sellers gain an equal increment of $25 from colluding, but when costs differ,
the payoff of the low cost seller increases by a maximum of $10.01 per round.15 Thus, while
unilateral deviation from the collusive equilibrium is unprofitable for either seller, its
attainment is contingent on the low cost seller being fully convinced that the high cost seller
will behave in accordance with the equilibrium. Since examples of irrationality abound and
the consequences could be severe, it may take longer to establish the viability of collusion.
The payoff increases by a maximum of $10.01 when both sellers price at r and adopt guarantees. However,
consider a case where although both sellers price match, the high cost seller chooses a price less than $8. The
profit of the low cost seller will then be less than the Bertrand profit of $29.90.
15
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This conjecture is also in line with findings of Mason et al. (1992) that markets where sellers
face different costs are significantly less cooperative.
In the case of large cost asymmetry, cl = 2 and ch2 = 8, collusion at the reservation price
continues to yield the low cost seller a maximum profit of $40 per round. However, it is no
longer the profit maximizing option. The low cost seller earns a higher profit of $59.90 per
round if she undercuts the cut the cost of the high cost seller to capture the entire demand.
Accordingly, the low cost seller is indifferent between adopting and not the price matching
guarantee. The high cost seller should not choose to match prices, since this may lead to
negative earnings in equilibrium if the low cost seller prices below the high marginal cost.
Note that, unlike before in case of large cost differences, price matching guarantees should
cease to act as a collusion facilitating device. Profit maximization yields different solutions
for the two sellers, and guarantee adoption alone can no longer coordinate sellers towards a
common collusive equilibrium. However, since the collusive equilibrium yields maximum
profit to the high cost seller, the high cost seller has an incentive to “teach,” or signal to the
low cost seller by price matching in early periods. In our experiments, we consider a finite
period game, where subjects know the termination period and are randomly re-matched every
four periods, but such repeated game behavior cannot be ruled out.16 A more detailed
discussion on these repeated game incentives and their impact on subject behavior appears in
the results section.
To summarize, the inclusion of two asymmetric cost treatments, one where employing
price guarantees is optimal and another where it is not optimal, enables us to analyze whether
subjects understand the incentives entailed by the cost advantage for both pricing and the
adoption of price matching guarantees. The small cost asymmetry treatment tests for the
robustness of the collusive equilibrium in the presence of cost asymmetries; and the large cost
asymmetry treatment tests whether the use of guarantees arises out of mere novelty value or if
policy adoption is grounded in sound profit considerations. The testable hypotheses for the
asymmetric cost treatment, following predictions by Logan and Lutter (1989), may be
summarized as follows

16

We thank the associate editor for bringing this to our attention.
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Hypothesis 3: In the small cost asymmetry treatment, both sellers price at the collusive level

($10, $10) and adopt price matching guarantees when available. Sellers make a profit of $40
each.
Hypothesis 4A: In the large cost asymmetry treatment, the low cost seller is indifferent

between adopting or not adopting price matching guarantees, while the high cost seller will
not adopt price matching guarantees.
Hypothesis 4B: In the large cost asymmetry treatment, low cost sellers price at the Bertrand-

Nash level, p = $7.99, earning a profit of $59.90 while the high cost seller earns zero profit.

4. Results

For simplicity of exposition, we will divide our analysis along the lines of symmetric and
asymmetric cost treatments. In each subsection we begin with a graphical description of the
data. Formal tests, both parametric and non-parametric, are then employed to test the model’s
predictions and results are evaluated as support (or lack thereof) of the testable hypotheses,
which are summarized in Table 2. In order to account for initial learning and the hysteresis
effect arising from treatment changes, formal tests exclude the first 8 periods of each
treatment run. We therefore restrict the analysis to last 8 periods of the NPM run and last 16
(or 40) periods of each PM run.17

4.A Symmetric cost treatment

Market transaction prices, averaged across the four duopolies in each symmetric cost
session, appear in Table 3. Figures 1 and 2 show the time series of average market prices in
all 8 symmetric cost sessions. Broadly speaking, prices in the experiment are consistent with
the equilibrium prediction, although in some cases full convergence to the equilibrium price
did not occur.
We begin with the NPM treatment. Relevant to this discussion are sequences 1 and 3
(rounds 1-16 and 41-56) from Figure 1 and sequence 2 (rounds 17-40) from Figure 2, where
subjects are not allowed to match prices. As can be seen from the figures, prices in all 8
17

We are interested in the test of the equilibrium prediction of the model. Therefore, we exclude the initial
periods where behavior is more erratic as subjects learn about the market structure and the incentives they face.
Exclusion of the first 8 periods of each treatment run was based on the premise that subjects would have
experienced the price guarantee decision at least twice. However, results are not significantly different if we
exclude the first 12 periods.

15

sessions tend towards the predicted equilibrium level of $5, but do not converge to the
Bertrand price, as predicted. This observation is consistent with previous experimental work
by Fouraker and Siegel (1963) and Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), who find that in duopoly
markets prices remain much higher than the Bertrand prediction. Of course, from a
methodological point of view, one might suspect that the attraction of the equilibrium
outcome is considerably undermined by the non-saliency of equilibrium payoffs (zero profit).
The contest between the desire to make positive profit and the incentive to undercut rival’s
price is evident from the fact that prices are higher when subjects are re-matched into new
duopolies but decline over the four period interaction (p-value = 0.00).18 In contrast to the
predicted behavior of competing away all profits, subjects in the experiment made an average
profit of $65.20 by pricing above the Bertrand level.
Sequence 2 (rounds 17-24) in Figure 1 and sequences 1 and 3 (rounds 1-24 and 41-64) in
Figure 2 display the times series of average market transaction prices for the PM treatment.
Consistent with the equilibrium prediction, market prices in the PM treatment reach the profitmaximizing level of $10 in almost all sessions, sometimes as early as round 4 for Session S2.
Only once, in session S5, did subjects fail to achieve the reservation value in their first
experience with price matching opportunities, although the prices in the last 8 rounds of that
treatment were strictly increasing. Upon gaining access to price matching again in sequence 3,
prices in this particular session almost immediately converged to the predicted price. The
square markers identify the first round in which 100 percent of subjects chose to offer price
matching guarantees. It is clear that in almost all cases, subjects recognize the profit
maximizing potential of price guarantees fairly early and eventually all subjects chose to
match prices in 11 of the 12 sequences where the option was available.

Result 1: Prices in the PM treatment are significantly higher compared to prices in the NPM

treatment. (Support for Hypothesis 1)
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This edgeworth cycle-like pricing reflects a ‘restart’ phenomenon in cooperative behavior. Duffy and Ochs
(2006) examine cooperative behavior in an infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a fixed matching
protocol. Similar to our study, they find that the restart phenomenon does not dampen with experience. The
aggregate frequency of cooperation increases at the beginning of each new pairing as subjects attempt to
encourage a social norm of cooperation. Analogous to the subsequent undercutting observed in our study, they
also find a decline in the level of cooperation following the first round.
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Support: The difference in the results between the PM and NPM treatment amounts to an
increased average market price of $3.78 when price matching is available. Within session
comparison of prices in the two treatments using the sign test and sign rank test favor the
alternative hypothesis that prices in the PM treatment are significantly greater than prices in
the NPM treatment (p-value=0.004 for a one-sided sign test and p-value=0.01 for the signed
rank test, sample sizes n=m=8). This result is significant, irrespective of sequence order of
treatments, and therefore the level of experience.19
The same result holds true for the across session comparisons. Comparing sequence 1
prices in sessions S1-S4 (NPM) with those in sessions S5-S8 (PM) gives us an estimate of the
difference in the two treatments using observations which are untainted by experience. The
Mann-Whitney test based on statistically independent observations from each of the eight
sessions rejects the null hypothesis that prices are the same in the first sequence across the
two treatments (p-value = 0.02). Similarly, a comparison of prices in sequence 3, where
subjects have experienced both PM and NPM treatments, concurs with the previous result that
prices are higher with price matching (p-value = 0.02).
Table 5 provides estimates for the coefficient of variation (CV) of prices across the PM
and NPM treatments. As a standardization of the standard deviation, CV allows for a
comparison of variability estimates, regardless of the magnitude of prices. The low values of
CV especially in the last two sequences of the PM treatment indicate that most prices are
close to the mean, which in turn is close to the collusive outcome of $10. Thus, price
matching guarantees not only increase the average market price, but also provide stability to
the pricing structure.
To further validate these results and control for factors such as time trend, we employed
panel data econometric methods that model the dependence of observations and errors arising
from repeated measures drawn from the same set of subjects. Correct statistical inferences
can be made by including random effect models for errors arising out of subject-level pricing
decisions, fixed effect models for session-level and sequence-level analyses and a time trend
19

As can be seen in Figure 1, the results from the two NPM sequences are different. Prices in the third sequence
are significantly higher than price in the first sequence (one-tailed sign test p-value=0.0625 and sign rank test pvalue=0.0679, sample sizes n=m=4). However despite the sequence ordering and consequent learning, in all
symmetric cost sessions, prices in the PM treatment remain significantly higher compared to the NPM treatment.
The importance of this result is underlined by the results of the asymmetric cost sessions, where prices in
different asymmetric cost runs can be explained in large part by sequence ordering alone.
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variable (ln(period) or 1/period). The results from these regressions confirm those obtained
using nonparametric tests. Furthermore, while neither session dummies nor time trend was
significant, we found that prices were increasing in lagged profit and lagged prices (both
posted and market transaction prices). This is consistent with the visual observation of a trend
of increasing prices. It is also in sharp contrast with Fatas and Mañez’s (2004) largely
inexplicable result that the market prices fall over time when price guarantees are optional.

Result 2: Both sellers adopt price matching guarantees. (Support for Hypothesis 2)

Support: Aggregating across all symmetric cost sessions, 87.5 percent of the subjects adopt
PM in the very first round of availability. The average adoption rate for all periods is 94.3
percent, with almost complete unanimity in the last guarantee decision period (period 20).
These results are consistent with other studies like Fatás and Mañez (2004) and Dugar (2005)
who report an adoption rate of 70 and 90 percent respectively. Moreover, after having chosen
to match prices, less than 2 percent of the subjects deviate back to no-price matching. The
dominance of PM over NPM as a policy choice is therefore irrefutable.
What is interesting, however, is not the guarantee adoption rate in isolation, but its
accordance with the pricing decision. Subjects do realize the collusive nature of guarantees.
The correlation between policy adoption and higher prices is positive (0.7) and significant at
the 1-percent level. When subjects chose to match prices, the average posted price is $9.92
and although the frequency of non-adoption of price matching was low, when chosen, the
NPM option is accompanied by an average posted price of $7.28. Panel data regressions also
confirm the fact that prices posted by PM sellers are significantly higher than prices posted by
NPM sellers (p-value = 0.01).
Summarizing the results thus far, we can state that when costs are symmetric, price
matching guarantees successfully act as a collusion facilitation device, resulting in prices that
are significantly higher than the Bertrand-Nash level.

4.B Asymmetric cost treatment

As detailed in Section 3, we began our investigation of the impact of seller cost
asymmetry on tacit collusion with the “dual cost” sessions. Each session began with 16
rounds of baseline NPM treatment followed by 48 rounds of PM treatment, where level of
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cost asymmetry was switched half way through the PM treatment. Thus, in sessions S9 to S12
subjects faced small cost asymmetry (cl = 2 and ch1 = 5) in the first 16 NPM rounds and 24
PM rounds; and the last 24 PM rounds featured large cost asymmetry (cl = 2 and ch2 = 8). This
order was reversed in sessions S13 to S16 to account for sequencing order and level of
experience.
Figures 3 and 4 present the time series of average market transaction prices in each round
for all eight asymmetric “dual cost” sessions. With small cost asymmetry, the prediction for
the PM treatment is collusive pricing at $10. As seen in the second sequence of Figure 3
(rounds 17-40) and the third sequence in Figure 4 (rounds 41-64), this outcome is obtained
and sustained in only 3 of the 8 sessions (S9, S13 and S15). Average market price in the
remaining sessions trends upwards but fails to reach the reservation price by the last round.
Average market prices in the PM treatment with large cost asymmetry can be seen in the third
sequence of Figure 3 (rounds 41-64) and the second sequence of Figure 4 (rounds 17-40). On
the whole, what stands out in these figures is the fact that the average price increases over
time, and continues to increase even after a shock to the level of cost asymmetry. The type of
shock, either small or large cost asymmetry, does not seem to make a difference.
Both greater variation in market price and its monotonic increase alludes to the fact that
perhaps learning is happening and remains unfinished. To address these concerns we ran
additional “single cost” sessions where the level of cost asymmetry was kept constant across
the entire session. Figure 5 presents the time series of average market prices for all four
asymmetric “single cost” sessions (S17-S20) where the level of cost asymmetry is small. The
corresponding presentation for large cost asymmetry sessions (S21-S24) is contained in
Figure 6. In these figures, we pool sessions with different spans of fixed seller costs (12 and
24 periods) since this difference was found to be insignificant.
Before proceeding to the formal analysis, we briefly note that the first 16 periods in each
of these figures (Figures 3-6) display prices in the NPM sequence, and overall, for both levels
of cost asymmetry, the model’s Bertrand-Nash price prediction seems to receive adequate
support. In fact, introducing cost asymmetry causes price to reach the Bertrand level faster
than in the symmetric cost treatment. Of greater interest, however, is the impact of price
guarantees on prices when seller costs are asymmetric. Therefore, we begin our analysis by
documenting the impact of guarantees on the emergence of collusion.
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Result 3: Irrespective of level of cost asymmetry, prices in the PM treatment are higher than

prices in the NPM treatment.
Support: Comparing prices in the NPM treatment run with the succeeding PM treatment run
provides evidence for this result. Table 4.A and 4.B report the summary statistics for “dual
cost” and “single cost” asymmetric sessions. Since subjects made pricing decisions in both
NPM and PM treatment, we construct statistically independent pairwise differences for the
nonparametric sign test and sign rank test. In constructing these pairwise differences, we
aggregate across all sessions which featured a particular level of cost asymmetry. Since the
level of asymmetry was varied in the “dual cost” sessions, we restrict our analysis to
comparison of the average prices in the first NPM sequence (periods 8 to 16) to the prices in
the second PM sequence (periods 24 to 48). For example, in session S9, the average market
transaction price is $5.45 in the NPM treatment and it is equal to $8.75 in sequence 2 of the
PM treatment. The difference of $3.30 is one of the eight statistically independent pairwise
differences for sessions with small cost asymmetry. The difference statistics for other small
cost asymmetry sessions are also positive, so both the sign test and sign rank test reject the
null hypothesis that positive and negative differences are equally likely (p-value=0.01).
Laboratory data therefore provides support to the theoretical prediction that in markets with
small cost asymmetry, price matching eliminates incentive to undercut leading to higher
prices. However, theory also predicts that the adoption of price matching guarantees should
not increase prices in markets with large cost asymmetries. This is refuted in the lab. In all but
one session with large cost asymmetry, PM prices are higher than the NPM prices. Since 9 out
of 10 differences are positive, we can reject the null hypothesis of no difference using the
within session nonparametric tests (p-value= 0.01 for one-tailed sign test and sign rank test).
In addition to comparing the prices in the PM treatment with those in the NPM treatment,
we can also compare the PM prices under different guarantee combinations. Figure 7 and 8
present asymmetry treatment-specific average market price when either, both or none of the
sellers adopt price-matching guarantees. Regardless of the level of asymmetry, it is clear that
markets where both sellers adopt price guarantees have significantly higher prices than those
without such guarantees.
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Next we address the magnitude of the increase in prices. In the symmetric cost treatment
we report that prices rise up to the collusive level, but the differential gains from cooperation
in the asymmetric cost treatment can affect both the attainment and sustainability of the
precise collusive outcome. Therefore, to explore how the ability of price guarantees to act as a
facilitation device for collusion is affected by the presence of cost asymmetry, we compare
the level of collusion in the symmetric and asymmetric cost treatments.

Result 4: Cost asymmetry makes collusion more difficult.

Support: As detailed in the previous section, equilibrium predictions for the PM and NPM
treatment are invariant to the inclusion of small cost asymmetry. However, despite similar
predictions, on average, PM prices in the small cost asymmetry treatment (cl = 2 and ch1 = 5)
are lower than PM prices with symmetric costs (c = 5). Note that sequence 2 of S1-S4
(symmetric treatment) is directly comparable to sequence 2 of S9-S13 (“dual cost”
asymmetric treatment), where the only difference arises out the asymmetric structure of seller
cost in the latter four sessions. Both treatments had 16 rounds of baseline NPM treatment
before subjects were allowed the option to match prices, yet in the symmetric cost treatment
the collusive price prevails in the 8th round of PM treatment, at the very latest. In contrast, it
takes 20 rounds of price matching for session S9 in Figure 3 to reach the reservation value and
few of the remaining sessions do. On average, we can state that prices in markets with cost
asymmetries do increase during the course of the session, albeit at a much slower rate than
when costs are symmetric. The Mann-Whitney rank sum test based on independent
observations from the symmetric and “dual cost” asymmetric sessions (S1-S16), supports this
visual impression. PM prices with cost asymmetry are significantly lower than PM prices with
symmetric costs (p-value=0.001, n=m=8).
Comparison of the NPM prices can be made along similar lines. Comparing sequence 1
prices in Figures 1 and 3, it is easy to see that introducing cost asymmetry into the market
causes prices to reach the Bertrand level faster than in the symmetric cost treatment. These
low prices may be attributed to the fact that the low cost firm is making strictly positive
profits even by pricing at high-marginal cost. The highest price in the NPM sequence of
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asymmetric cost sessions is less than the lowest price in the symmetric cost sessions, and so
the Mann-Whitney test rejects the null hypothesis of equal prices (p-value=0.02, n=m=4).20
The finding that, in the absence of price matching, markets with (small) cost asymmetry
reach the Bertrand-Nash prediction faster than the symmetric cost markets, yet take longer to
achieve the collusive outcome with price matching, suggests that markets where sellers face
different unit costs may be less cooperative. This is in line with the result of Mason et al.
(1992), who found that payoff symmetry is a powerful facilitator of collusive behavior. They
report that duopoly firms with symmetric costs make decisions that fall between the Nash and
collusive equilibria, while markets with cost asymmetry tend closer to the Nash prediction.
Table 6 provides a measure of the variation in observed prices compared to the mean.
Unlike the symmetric cost treatment, price matching guarantees are unable to reduce the
variance in prices.21 Although, in some cases, the variance declines over time, no clear pattern
of subject learning across different cost asymmetry treatments can be discerned. In fact, from
Figures 3 and 4 it is easy to see that while PM prices with small cost asymmetry are much
higher than the Bertrand level, they are not very different from the transaction prices attained
in the large cost asymmetry treatment. This calls for further investigation.
Result 5: PM prices in the small cost asymmetry treatment (cl = 2 and ch1 = 5) are not

different from PM prices in the large cost asymmetry treatment (cl = 2 and ch2 = 8).
Support: In the “dual cost” sessions, each group of subjects made decisions in both small and
large cost asymmetry treatments, with treatment order varied. Conservative within session
nonparametric tests that use the statistically independent pairwise difference in each of the
eight sessions fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in prices across the
two cost asymmetry treatments (p-value=0.73 for two-tailed sign test and p-value=0.78 for the
sign rank test). Consistent with the visual observation, what seems to make a difference is the
order of the sequence. The average market price in the small and large cost asymmetry is
$8.55 and $8.46, while the average price in sequence 2 and 3 is $7.94 and $9.12. Accordingly,
20

These results hold even when we pool observation across all small cost asymmetry sessions (both “dual” and
“single” cost sessions). That is, regardless of how often seller cost is switched, NPM prices with cost asymmetry
are lower than NPM prices with symmetric cost (p-value=0.03, n=4, m=8); and PM prices with cost asymmetry
are lower than PM prices with symmetric cost (p-value=0.0002, n=8, m=12).
21
The Mann-Whitney rank sum test based on independent observations from the symmetric and “dual cost”
asymmetric sessions (S1-S16), rejects the null hypothesis of equal variance (p-value=0.001, n=m=8).
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within session tests favor the alternative hypothesis that prices are lower in sequence 2 than in
sequence 3 (p-value=0.04 for the one-sided sign test and p-value= 0.02 for the rank test).22
Results are strikingly similar in the “single cost” sessions where the level of cost
asymmetry is kept constant through out the sessions. Analogous to the results for the “dual
cost” sessions, in the “single cost” sessions we find that prices in sequence 2 (rounds 17-48)
are significantly lower than prices in sequence 3 (rounds 41-64) (p-value = 0.07 for two-tailed
sign test and p-value=0.04 for the sign rank test). To account for price differences arising out
of sequence effect, we conduct the across session asymmetry comparisons separately for
sequences 2 and 3. We find that Mann-Whitney test fails to reject the null hypothesis that in
sequence 2, prices in the small cost asymmetry sessions S17-S20 are equal to prices in the
large cost asymmetry sessions S21-S24 (p-value=0.25, n=m=4). Similar conclusions can be
drawn if we compare sequence 3 prices across the two levels of cost asymmetry.
Hence, regardless of whether comparisons are made within session or across sessions and
despite the starkly different equilibrium predictions, we find that prices in PM treatment are
invariant to the level of cost asymmetry. This conclusion is important since it highlights the
fact that guarantees eliminate the disparity between the pricing structures of two different
levels of cost asymmetry. This conclusion, however, is based on absolute price levels, and it
would be erroneous to infer that the impact of price matching guarantees is the same for both
cost structures. Next, we compare whether PM prices under different levels of cost asymmetry
converge closer to collusive outcome or remain at the Bertrand-Nash levels.
Result 6: PM prices in the small cost asymmetry treatment (cl = 2 and ch1 = 5) are closer to

the collusive outcome than to the Bertrand-Nash outcome. PM prices in the large cost
asymmetry treatment (cl = 2 and ch2 = 8) lie further away from the collusive outcome than
from the Bertrand-Nash outcome. (Qualitative support for Hypotheses 3 and 4B.)
Support: In order to examine whether the behavior in the PM treatment with small cost
asymmetry is better described by the collusive or the Bertrand-Nash outcome, we calculate
the average deviation in market transaction prices from the two benchmarks. For example, in
sequence 2 of session S9, the average deviation of the observed market price from the
22

Similar conclusions are reached using the across session comparisons. For both small and large cost
asymmetry treatments, prices were lower in sequence 2 when compared to sequence 3 (p-value=0.08 for the
Mann-Whitney rank sum test).
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Bertrand-Nash equilibrium of $4.99 is 3.75 and the average deviation from the collusive
outcome of $10 is 1.25. This level of difference is similar across most sessions with small cost
asymmetry.23 Pooling across all “single and dual” small cost asymmetry sessions, we find the
average deviation from the Bertrand equilibrium is 3.67 times the average deviation from the
collusive equilibrium. This suggests that the collusive outcome describes subject behavior
better than the Bertrand outcome. More formally, nonparametric tests on the pair-matched
observations of these average deviations provide evidence in favor of larger deviations of
observed prices from the Bertrand level rather than from the collusive price level. In 14 out of
the possible 16 negative differences for deviation, summary statistic lead to a sign rank test
value of -3.3, which is significant at 1-percent level. We can therefore conclude that although
cost asymmetry makes collusion more difficult (Result 4), the average market prices in the
PM treatment with small cost asymmetry converge closer to the collusive outcome than to the
Bertrand outcome.
In case of large cost asymmetry, theory predicts that price matching guarantees are not
effectively used in the Nash equilibrium and thus, are not required to support the equilibrium
price. Yet, in the laboratory, we document that price guarantees led to prices greater than the
NE price, even with large cost asymmetry (Result 3). The question then remains whether the
increase in PM prices is sufficiently large to rise up to the collusive level of $10, or if the
increase is closer to the Bertrand outcome of $7.99. As with small cost asymmetry, we
calculate the average deviation of the observed market price from the collusive and Bertrand
outcomes, but unlike before, the result is less stark. In only one-quarter of the sessions with
large cost asymmetry (5 out of 20), the deviation from the collusive prediction is less than that
from the Bertrand prediction.
Pooling across all sessions, however, the average deviation of the observed price from the
collusive level (1.47) is greater than from the Bertrand level (0.97). Nonparametric tests on
the relevant pairwise differences also reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in
the average deviation of observed prices from the collusive and Bertrand outcome (p-value =
0.04 for sign test and sign rank test). We can therefore conclude that in case of large cost
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The average deviation from collusive equilibrium is less than from Bertrand equilibrium in only two (out of
16) sessions: S10 and S12.
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asymmetry, although PM prices are higher compared to the NPM treatment, the observed
prices remain closer to the Bertrand-Nash level than to the collusive level.
Summarizing the results, we can state that, regardless of the level of cost asymmetry, price
matching guarantees help sustain a market price above the high-cost seller’s marginal cost
(Result 3). In case of small cost asymmetry, it takes significantly longer to see an increase in
the average market price (Result 4), but on an average, observed prices do converge closer to
the collusive rather than to the Bertrand-Nash level (Result 6). With large cost asymmetry, the
adoption of price guarantees increases average market prices, but the observed prices remain
closer to the Bertrand-Nash level (Result 6). In the experiment, the use of price guarantees
implies smaller than predicted differences in prices across the two different levels of cost
asymmetry (Result 5). The only questions remaining concern the factors that influence the use
of such guarantees.

4.C Adoption of Price Matching Guarantees

Table 7 reports the frequency of price guarantee adoption in the later periods of the
asymmetric cost sessions. Unlike the symmetric cost treatment, the price guarantee decision is
not straightforward when costs are asymmetric. Theory predicts that the low cost seller (cl =
2) will be indifferent between whether or not to adopt price matching guarantees. In practice,
however, these guarantees may serve as an insurance policy against irrational undercutting by
the high cost seller and therefore allows the low cost seller to attempt higher prices.
Accordingly, in the experiment we find that 89.25 percent of the low cost sellers employ price
matching guarantees. Furthermore, subjects who adopt price matching guarantees post prices
that are significantly higher than subjects who chose not to adopt such guarantees (pvalue<0.001).
In the case of small cost asymmetry (ch1 = 5), the highest profit yielding equilibrium is for
both sellers to price at the collusive level. However, for the low cost seller, the difference
between the collusive and the Bertrand profit is small. Furthermore, the level of Bertrand
profit is known, whereas collusive pricing requires the low cost seller to make assumptions
regarding the rationality of the high cost seller, and therefore is less certain. Price guarantees
provide the high cost seller a means to signal her cooperation or rationality to the low cost
seller. By adopting price matching guarantees, the high cost seller essentially delegates the
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pricing decision to the low cost seller. This delegation to a single seller has the benefit that
price will be set closer to the collusive level. A majority of the subjects in the experiment
recognized the advantage of this delegation. Overall, in case of small cost asymmetry, 79.9
percent of the high cost sellers chose to adopt price matching guarantees. Within session
comparisons show that adoption rates of the high cost sellers are not significantly different
from those of the low cost sellers (p-value = 0.2 for the one tailed sign test and p-value =0.08
for the sign rank test).
Of course, it is possible that subjects in the experiment chose to match prices simply
because it was a new option and assumed that they were supposed to use it. The large cost
asymmetry treatment helps us distinguish the novelty value and experimenter expectation
effect from profit considerations. In the case of large cost asymmetry (ch2 = 8), it is not
optimal for the high cost seller to delegate its pricing decision to a seller whose costs and
optimal price are very different from its own. By not adopting price guarantees, a high cost
seller can keep control of its pricing and ensure itself non-negative profit. In the experiment,
we find that less than half the high cost sellers refrain from price matching (46.13 percent).
While these adoption rates are clearly much lower than that of the low cost sellers (p-value =
0.02 for the sign test and 0.01 for the sign rank test) or that of the high cost sellers in case of
small cost asymmetry (p-value= 0.02 for Mann-Whitney test), they are much higher than the
equilibrium prediction. Therefore, the repeated adoption of price guarantees cannot be
explained by novelty value, or the subjects’ response to assumed experimenter expectations
alone.
Roth and Murnigham (1978) find that responsiveness of cooperation is positively related
to the probability of continuation in an infinitely repeated prisoner dilemma stage game. Note
that in theory, our game involves a one-shot static interaction and the high cost seller can do
no better than remain content with zero profit. In practice, however, subjects play the game
repeatedly and the dynamics are much more complex. The high cost seller remains matched
with the same seller for four periods and therefore has an incentive to teach the other seller to
split the market. This is possible only by adopting a price matching guarantee. For instance,
consider a situation where in period 1, the low cost seller adopts the equilibrium strategy of
marginal cost undercutting and prices at $7.99. The high cost seller, on the other hand,
chooses to adopt the price matching guarantee and prices at the collusive level of $10. Since
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the high cost seller chose to match prices, the effective price becomes $7.99 and the 10 buyers
are equally split between the two sellers. The high cost seller makes an aggregate profit of
negative $0.05 in period 1. The profit for the low cost seller is positive ($29.95), but strictly
lower than either the collusive profit ($40) or the Bertrand profit ($79.9). Since the price
guarantee decision is fixed for periods 2, 3 and 4, and the low cost seller cannot engage in
undercutting, she is better off by pricing at the collusive level. Therefore, by incurring a oneperiod loss of $0.05, the high cost seller can potentially make a profit of $10 in each of the
remaining 3 interactions.
Of course, likewise, the low cost seller has the incentive not to give in to strategic play by
the high cost seller. In period 1, the threat by the high cost seller to adopt price matching is
not credible, but becomes real in the subsequent periods, when the price matching guarantee
decision is sunk. By engaging in undercutting, regardless of the guarantee decision of the high
cost seller, a low cost seller can teach a high cost seller to remain passive over the length of
the session. This credible threat of future retaliation can modify the high cost seller’s behavior
and restore the Bertrand-Nash outcome.
It is therefore important to examine both sides of play: whether or not the high cost seller
employs repeated game strategies and if so, to what extent it affects the opportunistic behavior
of the low cost seller.
Our design does not include randomly terminated interactions, so one-to-one comparison
to repeated game behavior observed in infinitely repeated games is not feasible. However,
some suggestive answer to the first question can be obtained by reversing the argument and
investigating whether the observed play in our finite horizon game is similar to the one-shot
game considered in the literature. To this end, we compare sessions where the guarantee
decision is fixed for the length of the interaction (four periods) to sessions where the
guarantee decision is made every period (S25 and S26). In the latter sessions, the high cost
seller can no longer force the collusive equilibrium through repeated play, so the best strategy
is not to adopt price guarantee. The data show that the adoption rate for the high cost seller
decreases to 36.7 percent, compared to an all-sessions average of 50.1 percent, and is still
significantly greater than zero. This indicates that repeated play as a strategic move alone
cannot explain the disproportionately high adoption rates by the high cost seller.
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Further support in this regard is provided in a recent study by Dal Bó (2005). Dal Bó
compares the rate of cooperation in a fixed finite horizon game (where subjects remain
matched for four periods) to an infinitely repeated game (where the probability of
continuation is ¾). He finds that although the expected number of rounds is the same in both
games, rates of cooperation in the first round of the finite horizon game is significantly lower.
Furthermore, this cooperation declines so the level of cooperation in the final round of the
finite horizon game is similar to the level of cooperation in a one-shot game. He concludes
that cooperation does not depend on the length of interaction, but on the “shadow of the
future”. Since the length of interaction is fixed and known in our experiment, following this
experimental evidence, we conjecture that repeated game strategies are not likely to have
come into play.
The remaining question is the impact of these high adoption rates on the low cost seller’s
incentive for cooperation. Indirect evidence was documented earlier in Result 6. We report
that PM prices in large cost asymmetry sessions are closer to the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium
rather than the collusive outcome, which indicates that strategic play by the high cost seller
does not invoke cooperation from the low cost seller.24 More direct evidence can be obtained
by comparing the average price posted by the low cost seller in the non-guarantee decision
rounds (periods 2, 3 and 4) to the average price in the decision round (period 1). It is
conjectured that if the strategic play by the high cost seller is effective, then the average price
in the non-decision rounds should be higher. However, both the sign test and sign rank test
favor the null hypothesis that pairwise differences in the average price of decision and nondecision round are not significant. Therefore, we find that repeated interaction does not limit
subjects’ static opportunistic behavior, either in terms of pricing or in terms of guarantee
adoption.
Finally, since the phenomenon of repeated adoption of price guarantees by the high cost
sellers cannot entirely be explained by either the novelty value or the repeated game
incentives, we can potentially invert the causality argument. In particular, we conjecture that
perhaps the supra-competitive prices observed in the PM treatment (Results 3) resulted in
24

A similar result is obtained by Brown-Kruse et al. (1994) in an oligopoly market experiment. They find that a
finite number of repetitions raises prices above the competitive levels, but that prices still remain far below the
monopoly outcome. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1994) find that the rate of contribution in a public goods game does
increase with repetition but the increase is small (from 29 to 40 percent).
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widespread adoption. In the NPM sequence of the large cost asymmetry sessions, the high
cost sellers are usually undercut by the low cost sellers and therefore made positive (negative)
profit a mere 3.4 (15.9) percent of the time. This contrasts with the PM sequence, where the
proportion of high cost sellers making negative profit remains the same (15.5 percent), but
46.8 percent of the sellers made positive profit.
To analyze other factors that may influence guarantee choice behavior across the two cost
asymmetry treatments, we employ parametric modeling techniques. Table 8 presents the
estimates of random effect probit regressions. The dependent variable is one when the seller
adopts a price guarantee. Consistent with the theoretical prediction we find that the use of
price guarantees is significantly lower in case of large cost asymmetry (row 1). Results in the
second row indicate that low cost sellers adopt price matching guarantees more often than the
high cost sellers, irrespective of the level of high cost. Furthermore, the usage of guarantees
was found to be increasing in lagged own guarantee usage and lagged other seller’s guarantee
usage (rows 3 and 4). This suggests that a form of own-and-observational learning takes
place over the course of the session. The fact that sequence-level fixed effects are positive and
significant is consistent with the previous observation that prices are higher in sequence 3.
Lastly, we find that the lagged pricing decisions and consequent lagged profit levels seem to
have no impact on a seller’s decision of whether or not to adopt price matching guarantees.
Segregating along the lines of large and small cost asymmetry sessions, we find that, as
expected, the impact of seller cost on guarantee adoption rate is more pronounced in the large
cost asymmetry sessions. High cost sellers are much less likely to adopt price guarantees
when the cost asymmetry is large than when the cost asymmetry is small. Similar results
obtained in the “dual and single” cost asymmetry sessions indicate that the length of
interaction does not have a significant impact on sellers’ guarantee decisions.

5. Conclusion

In this experimental study we examine the impact of price matching guarantees on seller’s
pricing behavior in a homogeneous goods, posted offer duopoly market. Theory suggests that
price matching guarantees act as a facilitation device for collusion by eliminating seller’s
incentive to engage in competitive undercutting. Our findings establish that when costs are
symmetric, allowing sellers to institute price guarantees causes markets to attain and sustain
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the collusive outcome. When costs are asymmetric, however, differential gains for
cooperation affect the collusive ability of price matching guarantees. While prices with
guarantees remain higher than prices without the use of such guarantees, the attainment of
collusive levels is not absolute. The lesser use of price guarantees combined with lower
average prices and slower convergence to the reservation value alludes to the fact that by its
mere presence, the cost asymmetry might curtail collusive behavior.
It is important to note that the laboratory environment instituted in our experiment lacks
the complexity of a naturally occurring field environment. We abstract from structural
features such as product heterogeneity, unknown seller cost distribution, consumer
heterogeneity in information costs, consumer’s perception of such guarantees and their
subsequent search behavior. The next step is to explore if incorporating these facets will cause
the relationship between higher prices and usage of price guarantees to break down. Similarly,
it would be interesting to allow simultaneous institution of both price matching and price
beating guarantees, and analyze their impact on seller pricing decisions as well as study their
relative rates of adoption.
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Table 1: Experimental Design
Table 1.A: Experimental Design for Symmetric Cost Sessions
c=5
No. of sessions

Sequence 1

Sequence 2

Sequence 3

4

NPM*

PM*

NPM

4

PM

NPM

PM

Table 1.B: Experimental Design for Asymmetric Cost Sessions
cl = 2; ch1 = 5 and ch2 = 8
Dual cost sessions
Cost
PM
switch** option***

No. of sessions

NPM*

PM*

PM

4

ch1 = 5

ch1 = 5

ch2 = 8

4

4

4

ch2 = 8

ch2 = 8

ch1 = 5

4

4

Single Cost sessions
Cost
PM
switch** option***

No. of sessions

NPM

PM

PM

2

ch1 = 5

ch1 = 5

ch1 = 5

24

4

2

ch1 = 5

ch1 = 5

ch1 = 5

12

4

2

ch2 = 8

ch2 = 8

ch2 = 8

24

4

2

ch2 = 8

ch2 = 8

ch2 = 8

12

4

2

ch2 = 8

ch2 = 8

ch2 = 8

12

1

Notes: *NPM (No Price Matching) treatment lasts for 16 rounds while the PM (Price Matching)
treatment lasts for 24 rounds.
** The number of periods after the cost was switched between the two sellers in the PM treatment. The
costs were switched after 8 periods in the NPM (12) and not switched at all in the NPM (24).
*** The number of periods after which PM option was made available.
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Table 2: Equilibrium Benchmarks

Symmetric
Costs

Cost

Price
Guarantee

Market
Price

Profit
Low cost

Profit
High cost

NPM

c=5

-

$5.00

$0

$0

PM

c=5

PM

$10.00

$25

$25

cl = 2
ch1 = 5

-

~$4.99

$29.90

$0

cl = 2
ch2 = 8

-

~$7.99

$59.90

$0

cl = 2
ch1 = 5

PM

$10.00

$40

$25

cl = 2
ch2 = 8

No PM

~$7.99

$40

$10

NPM
Asymmetric
Costs
PM
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Table 3: Average Market Price in Symmetric Cost Sessions*

Session ID#

Cost

Sequence 1
(Periods 1-16)

Sequence 2
(Periods 17-48)

Sequence 3
(Periods 49-64)

S1

5

$5.49

$9.98

$6.17

S2

5

$5.64

$10.00

$7.72

S3

5

$5.78

$10.00

$7.06

S4

5

$5.86

$10.00

$6.01

S5

5

$8.30

$5.80

$9.87

S6

5

$9.78

$5.82

$10.00

S7

5

$9.53

$6.35

$9.91

S8

5

$9.47

$6.07

$10.00

* Shaded regions in the table indicate periods when price matching guarantee option was available.
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Table 4: Average Market Price in Asymmetric Cost Sessions
Table 4.A: Average Market Price in Asymmetric “Dual Cost” Sessions**
Session ID#

Cost
Sequence*

NPM
(Periods 1-16)

PM
(Periods 17-48)

PM
(Periods 48-64)

S9

5-5-8

$5.45

$8.75

$9.55

S10

5-5-8

$4.82

$6.54

$8.64

S11

5-5-8

$5.23

$8.67

$9.04

S12

5-5-8

$4.41

$7.26

$8.48

S13

8-8-5

$7.27

$7.23

$9.81

S14

8-8-5

$7.79

$8.13

$8.39

S15

8-8-5

$7.97

$8.82

$9.62

S16

8-8-5

$7.23

$7.84

$9.40

* Cost sequence X-X-Y indicates that the cost of the high cost seller is X in the first two sequences (16
periods of the NPM treatment followed by 24 periods of PM treatment). In the last sequence, PM
treatment features high cost equal to Y.

Table 4.B: Average Market Price in Asymmetric “Single Cost” Sessions**
Session ID#

Cost
Sequence*

NPM
(Periods 1-16)

PM
(Periods 17-48)

PM
(Periods 48-64)

S17

5-12

$5.65

$9.14

$9.91

S18

5-12

$5.05

$9.26

$8.99

S19

5-24

$5.07

$8.1

$9.92

S20

5-24

$5.64

$9.54

$9.63

S21

8-12

$8.03

$8.65

$9.46

S22

8-12

$7.35

$8.44

$8.69

S23

8-24

$7.84

$8.15

$9.8

S24

8-24

$7.35

$8.51

$9.11

* Cost sequence B-C indicates that the cost of high cost seller is B and the seller costs are switched
after C periods.
** Shaded regions in the table indicate periods with large cost asymmetry (cl = 2 and ch2= 8).
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Table 5: Coefficient of Variation in Symmetric Cost Sessions*

Session ID#

Cost

Sequence 1
(Periods 1-16)

Sequence 2
(Periods 17-48)

Sequence 3
(Periods 49-64)

S1

5

8.71

1.91

20.56

S2

5

8.91

0

19.70

S3

5

7.78

0

23.01

S4

5

9.21

0.2

12.44

S5

5

19.34

8.81

4.85

S6

5

6.33

11.30

0

S7

5

11.82

16.82

3.29

S8

5

11.45

22

0

* Shaded regions in the table indicate periods when price matching guarantee option was available.
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Table 6: Coefficient of Variation in Asymmetric Cost Sessions
Table 6.A: Average Market Price in Asymmetric “Dual Cost” Sessions**
Session ID#

Cost
Sequence*

NPM
(Periods 1-16)

PM
(Periods 17-48)

PM
(Periods 48-64)

S9

5-5-8

22.67

19.79

15.66

S10

5-5-8

7.70

37.67

16.38

S11

5-5-8

8.14

20.62

13.32

S12

5-5-8

27.87

34.51

12.17

S13

8-8-5

17.03

29.16

8.32

S14

8-8-5

4.76

8.48

24.66

S15

8-8-5

1.07

12.76

12.35

S16

8-8-5

11.45

14.28

11.39

* Cost sequence X-X-Y indicates that the cost of the high cost seller is X in the first two sequences (16
periods of the NPM treatment followed by 24 periods of PM treatment). In the last sequence, PM
treatment features high cost equal to Y.

Table 6.B: Coefficient of Variation in Asymmetric “Single Cost” Sessions**
Session ID#

Cost
Sequence*

NPM
(Periods 1-16)

PM
(Periods 17-48)

PM
(Periods 48-64)

S17

5-12

17.06

16.93

4.79

S18

5-12

19.86

18.50

25.01

S19

5-24

5.14

28.12

6.27

S20

5-24

17.03

10.79

10.84

S21

8-12

3.48

9.70

8.16

S22

8-12

23.38

11.03

10.06

S23

8-24

7.31

19.13

9.27

S24

8-24

21.75

9.99

12.56

* Cost sequence B-C indicates that the cost of high cost seller is B and the seller costs are switched
after C periods.
** Shaded regions in the table indicate periods with large cost asymmetry (cl = 2 and ch2 = 8).
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Table 7: Frequency of adoption of price matching guarantees

Low cost
seller

High cost
seller

Percentage of time when both
sellers adopted PM

Dual cost sessions

83.59

71.83

63.28

Single Cost sessions

93.90

86.52

82.02

All sessions

89.25

79.91

73.57

Large Asymmetry
cl = 2 ch2 = 8

Low cost
seller

High cost
seller

Percentage of time when both
sellers adopted PM

Dual cost sessions

74.22

51.56

42.19

Single Cost sessions

78.02

55.73

40.66

All sessions

76.33

53.87

41.34

Small Asymmetry
cl = 2 ch1 = 5
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Table 8: Random Effects Probit Model of seller i’s decision to use price guarantee in the case of cost asymmetry.a
Dependent variable: Price Guarantee Dummy =1 if seller used price guarantee (= 0 otherwise)
Large cost
Small cost
Variable
All “single and dual” cost sessions
asymmetry asymmetry
Asycostdum = 1 if c = 2/8
-0.76**
-0.61**
-0.62**
= 0 if c = 2/5
(0.13)
(0.12)
(0.12)
High_cost = 1 if c = 5 or 8
= 0 if c = 2

-0.89**
(0.1)

Lagg = 1 if seller i used price
guarantee last period
= 0 otherwise
Lagotherg = 1 if seller j used
price guarantee last period
= 0 otherwise
Average Price of seller i
in the last 4 periods c
Sequence = 1 if periods 49-64
= 0 if periods 17-48

Dual cost
sessions
-0.65**
(0.16)

Single cost
sessions
-0.67**
(0.18)

-0.90**
(0.1)

-0.89**
(0.01)

-1.02**
(0.12)

-0.58**
(0.16)

-0.41**
(0.17)

-0.92**
(0.13)

0.81**
(0.11)

0.78**
(0.12)

0.95**
(0.14)

0.68**
(0.21)

-0.81**
(0.21)

1.66**
(0.15)

0.34**
(0.1)

0.31**
(0.1)

0.32**
(0.12)

0.47**
(0.19)

0.48**
(0.17)

0.42**
(0.14)

0.05
(0.03)
0.54**
(0.11)
-2.4
(1.93)
1.63**
(0.21)

0.36**
(0.11)
-1.63
(1.88)
0.75**
(0.23)

0.34**
(0.11)
-1.41
(1.87)
0.34
(0.33)

0.24*
(0.14)
-0.76
(2.38)
0.09
(0.25)

0.48**
(0.2)
-4.12
(3.07)
0.7*
(0.37)

0.87**
(0.17)
-4.91
(3.06)
1.52**
(0.37)

0.17
(0.21)
-1.12
(3.93)
0.27
(0.41)

Observations

1312

1312

1312

736

576

512

800

Log Likelihood

-596.07

-568.97

-567.31

-375.25

-196.72

-239.82

-277.16

1/(period)
Intercept

Standard errors are in parentheses. ** denotes 1% level of significance and * denotes 10% level of significance.
a
Probit model using session and sequence level fixed effects and subject level random effects.
b
Including an interaction term that accounts for lagged seller cost on past guarantees usage makes no significant difference to the results.
c
Marginal impact of average price of the last 3 periods (when the firm makes only pricing decisions) or average profit of the last 3 or last 4 periods on the
usage of price guarantees is never significant.
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SYMMETRIC COST SESSIONS (NPM - PM - NPM)
Market Transaction Price
Averaged across 4 duopolies per session
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Figure 1: Average Price in Symmetric cost sessions (NPM-PM-NPM)

SYMMETRIC COST SESSIONS (PM - NPM - PM)
Market Transaction Price
Averaged across 4 duopolies per session
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Figure 2: Average Price in Symmetric cost sessions (PM-NPM-PM)
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"DUAL COST" ASYMMETRY SESSIONS (2/5, 2/8)
Market Transaction Price
Averaged across four duopolies per session
Reservation Value
(Collusive Prediction)
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Figure 3: Average Price in “Dual Cost” Asymmetric sessions (2/5-2/8)

"DUAL COST" ASYMMETRY SESSIONS (2/8, 2/5)
Market Transaction Price
Averaged across four duopolies per session
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(Collusive Prediction)
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Figure 4: Average Price in “Dual Cost” Asymmetric sessions (2/8-2/5)
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"SINGLE COST" SMALL ASYMMETRY SESSIONS (2/5)
Market Transaction Price
Averaged across four duopolies per session
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Figure 5: Average Price in “Single Cost” Asymmetric sessions (2/5)

"SINGLE COST" LARGE ASYMMETRY SESSIONS (2/8)
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Figure 6: Average Price in “Single Cost” Asymmetric sessions (2/8)
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"SMALL COST" ASYMMETRY SESSIONS (2/5)
Average Market Transaction Price
Averaged across duopolies for different price guarantee combinations
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Figure 7: Average Price for different guarantee combinations in “Small Cost”
Asymmetry Sessions (2/5)

"LARGE COST" ASYMMETRY SESSIONS (2/8)
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Figure 8: Average Price for different guarantee combinations in “Large Cost”
Asymmetry Sessions (2/8)
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Appendix

Sample Instructions (Symmetric Cost sessions)
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision-making. Various research
agencies have provided funds for the conduct of this research. The instructions are simple
and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you may earn a considerable
amount of money that will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. It is in
your best interest to fully understand the instructions, so please feel free to ask any
questions at any time. It is important that you do not talk or discuss your information with
other participants in the room until the session is over.
All transactions in today’s experiment will be in experimental dollars. These
experimental dollars will be converted to real US dollars at the end of the experiment at
the rate of 55 experimental dollars = $1. Notice that the more experimental dollars you
earn, the more US dollars you earn. What you earn depends partly on your decisions and
partly on the decisions of other participants in this experiment. Also, before you make
any decisions in this experiment, you will be given a starting balance of 55 experimental
dollars, equal to $1.00 US. Any earnings you make in this experiment will be added to
your starting balance.
In this experiment we are going to conduct markets in which you will be a participant in a
sequence of trading periods. The experiment consists of 3 sequences, where each section
will be comprised of 16 or 24 trading periods. The instructions for each section will be
given at the start of that particular section.
In every period you will be a seller of a fictitious good X. The participants in today’s
experiment will be randomly re-matched every four periods into 8 markets with 2 sellers
in each market. Thus, you will be matched with the same seller for 4 periods in a row,
then the specific seller in your market will change randomly every four periods, for
example in period 1, period 5, period 9, and so on.
The buyers in each market in today’s experiment are simulated by computerized
“robots.” There are 10 robot buyers. The maximum price that each buyer is willing to pay
for a single unit is 10 experimental dollars, and this will be displayed on everyone’s
decision screen, as shown in Picture 1 on the next page. Each robot buyer will purchase
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one unit of good X each period, as long as the unit price is below the maximum price.
The maximum price will remain the same throughout the experiment. Buyers know the
price of both the sellers before making their purchase decision, and they will purchase
from the seller offering the lowest price. If both sellers set the same price then the 10
buyers are equally split between the two sellers. For example:

•

If Seller 1 sets a price of 6 dollars and Seller 2 sets a price of 8 dollars, then Seller
1 sells 10 units while Seller 2 sells 0 units.

•

If both Seller 1 and Seller 2 set a price of 6 dollars, then each seller will sell 5
units.

Trading Instructions for Section 1
In this section of the experiment, you will choose your price for good X in each
period. Each unit of the good costs you 5 experimental dollars to produce. You will pay
this cost only if you sell the good. For example, suppose you sell 10 units. Then your cost
is 50 experimental dollars, while if you sell zero units your cost is zero experimental
dollars. Also notice that if your cost is 5 dollars and you set any price below 5 dollars,
then your earnings will decrease for each unit sold.
You may enter any price greater than zero, but remember that the buyers are not
willing to pay a price greater than 10. Thus 3.46, 6.99, and 8 dollars are all acceptable
prices. After entering your price, please click the “continue” button. An example of the
decision screen is shown on the next page in Picture 1. The past period decisions of both
sellers and your past profits are displayed in the lower half of the screen. Notice the
history table in Picture 1, that P1 shows your price, while P2 displays the price of the
other seller in the market. Similarly, Q1 is the quantity of units you sold, while Q2 is the
quantity of units the other seller sold.
At the end of each period, your profit is computed and displayed on the output screen
as shown in Picture 2. Your profit is calculated as follows:
Profit = (price x number of units sold)–
(cost of producing the good (5) x number of units sold)
Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record all of the trading
information, your price (P1), quantity sold (Q1), the other seller’s price (P2) and quantity
(Q2) in your Personal Record sheet. Also, record your profit from this period and the
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total profit from all previous periods. Then click on the button on the lower right of your
screen to begin the next trading period. Recall that you will be randomly re-matched with
a different seller every 4 periods.
Are there any questions before we begin?

Picture 1 Decision Screen
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Picture 2 Outcome Screen
Trading Instructions for Section 2
This section is similar to Section 1. As in the previous section, you have to decide
what price to charge for a unit of good X. All unit costs and consumer rules are the same
as before, but in this section you will have an additional decision to make besides your
price. Every 4 periods, beginning in Period 1, you will be asked whether or not you
would like to use the price guarantee option. There is no cost to using this guarantee
option.

•
•

If you decide not to use the price guarantee option, then your price is exactly what
you choose it to be. That is, your effective price is the same as the price you enter
as your decision.
If you decide to use the price guarantee option, then two possible events may
occur.
1. If the other seller’s price is less than yours, your price will automatically
match the other seller’s price. For example, if your price is 8 dollars and the
other seller’s price is 4 dollars, then your effective price becomes 4 dollars as
well.
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2. If the other seller’s price is higher than yours, then your price stays the same.
For example, if your price is 8 dollars and the other seller’s price is 9 dollars,
then your effective price remains at 8 dollars.
Notice that whether or not you decide to match prices in Period 1, this decision is set
for the following three periods. Thus if you decide to use the price guarantee option in
Period 1, then you are also deciding to match prices in Periods 2, 3, and 4. In Period 5
you will again be asked if you would like to use the price guarantee option, and this will
also be your decision for Periods 6, 7, and 8. You can make your decision of whether or
not you would like to use the price guarantee option by clicking on the “Yes” or “No”
button on your decision screen. Notice that a record of your guarantee decision appears
under G1, while the other seller’s decision is G2. An example of the decision screen is
shown in Picture 3 on the next page.
At the end of the period, your profit is computed and displayed on the output screen
as shown in Picture 4. Your profit is calculated as follows:
Profit = (effective price x number of units sold) –
(cost of producing the good (5) x number of units sold)
An example of the outcome screen is shown on the next page. It is similar to the outcome
screen in section 1, except that this outcome screen also provides information about
whether you and/or the other seller used the price guarantee option.
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Picture 3 Decision Screen
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Picture 4 Outcome Screen

Once the outcome screen is displayed you should again record all of the trading
information, and whether you and/or the other seller offered a price guarantee by circling
YES or NO in your Personal Record sheet. Recall that you will be randomly re-matched
with a different seller every 4 periods.
Are there any questions before we begin?

Trading Instructions for Section 3
This section is the same as in Section 1, meaning that you do not have a price
guarantee option. You will choose a price for good X each period. Each unit of the good
still costs you 5 experimental dollars to produce. Recall that you will be randomly rematched with a different seller every 4 periods.

Are there any questions before we begin?
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